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RU 486 in the United States and Great Britain: 
A Case Study in Gender Bias 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 3,1991, Great Britain became the third country in the 
world to approve RU 486 1 for use as an abortifacient. 2 The 
Committee on the Safety of Medicines3 (CSM), the British equiv-
alent of the u.S. Food and Drug Administration4 (FDA), licensed 
RU 486 after determining it would be safe and effective.5 The 
FDA reached the opposite conclusion about RU 486, and imposed 
an Import Ban on June 9, 1989.6 The Import Ban prohibits 
personal use of RU 486 and constitutes the first major policy 
statement by the U.S. government on this drug. 7 In July 1992, 
the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a legal challenge to the Import 
1 Roussel-Uelaf, a French company whose major stockholder is the German chemical 
firm Hoescht, manufactures RU 486. The scientific name of RU 486 is mifepristone, and 
its trade name is mifegyne. The Safety and Effectiveness of the Abortifacient RU 486 in Foreign 
Markets; Opportunities and Obstacles to U.S. Commercialization: Hearing Before the Small Business 
Subcommittee on Regulation, Business Opportunities & Energy, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3,7-8 
(Dec. 5, 1991)[hereinafter RU 486 in Foreign Markets](testimony of Professor Etienne-
Emilie Baulieu, M.D., Ph.D., Professor of Biochemistry, School of Medicine, University 
of Paris-Sud, inventor of RU 486). 
2 Daniel Green, Abortion Pill Wins Approval, FIN. TIMES, July 4, 1991, at 8. An aborti-
facient is a chemical which induces an abortion. France licensed RU 486 for commercial 
distribution in September 1988. The People's Republic of China also disburses the drug. 
RU 486 in Foreign Markets, supra note 1, at 3, 5. 
Norway, Sweden, and Finland are scheduled to begin using RU 486 on January 1, 
1993. Holland, Spain, and Italy are likely to follow this trend. Aaron J. Lopez, Where RU 
486 Is Used, Gannett News Service, July 22, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni 
File. In April 1992, the German Hessen Health Ministry announced that elinical trials 
involving RU 486 as an abortifacient would begin soon. THE FEMINIST MAJORITY FOUN-
DATION, 1992 The RU 486 Report, No.1, at 1 [hereinafter RU 486 Report]. 
3 The Committee on the Safety of Medicines (CSM) was established under the authority 
of the Medicines Act of 1968. S.l. 1970, No. 1257. Its purpose is to advise the Medicines 
Commission on safety, quality, and effectiveness. Id. 
421 U.S.C. §§ 301-393 (1989). 
5 Clinical trials in London and Edinburgh involving 2,000 women demonstrated that 
RU 486 successfully induced abortions in 94-96 percent of the women. Caroline Lees, 
Abortion Pill Available in Summer, THE TIMES (London), June 30, 1991, at Home News. 
6 The Import Ban is officially referred to as Import Alert No. 66-47. See generally Benten 
v. Kessler, No. CV-92-3161, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10516 (E.D.N.Y. July 14, 1992). 
7 RU 486: The Import Ban and Its Effect on Medical Research: Hearing Before the Small 
Business Subcommittee on Regulation, Business Opportunities & Energy, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 
36 (Nov. 19, 1990)[hereinafter Import Ban]. 
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Ban brought by a woman who attempted to import RU 486 from 
Great Britain to the United States.s 
Thus, the United States and Great Britain utilized identical 
criteria to evaluate RU 486, yet promulgated policies regarding 
the use of RU 486 which are diametrically opposed. This Note 
assesses the legal climate surrounding RU 486 in the United 
States by means of comparison with Great Britain. Part I describes 
how RU 486 works and its numerous potential medical benefits. 
Part II compares the governmental and regulatory decision-mak-
ing of the FDA and the CSM. The policy goals underlying the 
regulatory framework in both countries are used to highlight 
differences in the U.S. and British health care systems. Against 
this background, Part III considers the role of gender perceptions 
in decision-making and the degree to which U.S. and British 
health care is responsive to gender-specific concerns. The U.S. 
policy regarding RU 486 is considered within the context of Equal 
Protection jurisprudence. The analysis in Part IV concludes that 
the contrast between the British decision to distribute RU 486 
and the U.S. imposition of an Import Ban may be attributed to 
differing conceptions of health care-policies which in the United 
States reflect, at least in part, inherent gender bias. 
I. RU 486: PHYSIOLOGICAL EFFECTS AND POTENTIAL 
ApPLICATIONS 
RU 486 has many potential uses, but the most extensive testing 
to date-and the most controversial-involves its effectiveness as 
an abortifacient. The drug is an antiprogestin, which means it 
interferes with the body's normal functioning of the hormone 
progesterone.9 A combination therapy is used to terminate early 
pregnancy: RU 486 is taken in combination with prostaglandin, 
another hormone, which further enhances the expelling forces 
of the uterus. 1O Use in France indicates that R U 486 taken with 
8 Benten v. Kessler, 112 S.Ct. 2929, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 4756 (July 17, 1992) (per curiam); 
see infra notes 118-35 and accompanying text. 
9 RU 486 blocks the receptor for progesterone inside cells of the uterus. Without 
progesterone, the lining of the uterus breaks down and is expelled, as in normal men-
struation. E.g. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO), Research in Human Reproduction, 
Biennial Report 1988-8938 (1990). 
10 [d. Roussel-Uelaf initially cited the unavailability of prostaglandins in the United 
States as one of the reasons the company would not pursue U.S. distribution. Michael 
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a prostaglandin fully expels the contents of the uterus more than 
95 percent of the time. I I Studies of RU 486 by the World Health 
Organization since 1983 in ten countries demonstrate efficacy 
rates similar to those observed in France. 12 Available data suggests 
that RU 486 taken in conjunction with prostaglandins may be 
safer than surgical abortion because the treatment avoids the risks 
of anesthesia and surgical complications. 13 Moreover, if side ef-
fects occur, researchers believe they are temporary because RU 
486 remains in the body less than forty-eight hours.14 
In addition to being an effective abortifacient, RU 486 has 
potential use in the treatment of numerous diseases and disor-
ders. 15 RU 486 appears to be particularly effective in the treat-
ment of breast cancer.16 In a 1987 French clinical trial, RU 486 
halted the growth of breast cancer in twelve out of twenty-two 
Klitsch, Alan Guttmacher Inst., RU 486: The Science and the Politics 13 (1989)[hereinafter 
Science & Politics); Ronald Kotu1ak, In U.S., Claims of New Uses Fuels Debate Over Abortion 
Pill, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 29, 1991, at Cl. 
The lack of compatible prostaglandins may soon be resolved by the use of a second 
pill, misoprostol. Dr. Baulieu reported that this new therapy proved effective in 95 percent 
of women ranging in age from 18 to 37. Lawrence K. Altman, A Simpler Way to Employ 
RU 486 is Reported, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1991, at C3. J.D. Searle Co. licensed misoprostol 
in the United States in 1988 for the prevention of ulcers. Id. 
11 RU 486 in Foreign Markets, supra note 1, at 2 (testimony of Dr. Baulieu). 
12 Multicentre trials have been conducted in the People's Republic of China, Cuba, 
Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Italy, Singapore, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Yu-
goslavia. WHO, supra note 9, at 40. 
The World Health Organization (WHO) discovered that blood loss may be greater for 
Chinese women in Hong Kong and Singapore, suggesting that racial and/or ethnic dif-
ferences in responsiveness to RU 486 needs to be studied further. Testing by WHO also 
indicates that it may be possible to obtain the same rate of complete abortion with much 
lower doses of RU 486 than the 600mg dose recommended by the manufacturer. Id. 
13 See Mindy J. Lees, I Want a New Drug: RU 486 and the Right to Choose, 63 S. CAL. L. 
REv. 1113, 1119 (1990). Complications of surgical abortion include cervical injury, per-
foration of the uterus, and scarring of the lining of the uterine cavity. RU 486 in Foreign 
Markets, supra note 1, at 4 (testimony of David Grimes, Professor of Obstetrics and 
Gynecology and Preventative Medicine, University of Southern California School of Med-
icine, at Los Angeles). 
Complications from use of RU 486 as an abortifacient·in France, such as heavy bleeding 
necessitating curettage and/or blood transfusions, are infrequent and have occurred in 
about 0.8 percent and 0.1 percent of 65,000 treated women, respectively. WHO, supra 
note 9, at 39. 
14 E.g., Lees, supra note 13, at 1118. 
15 See infra notes 16-31 and accompanying text. 
16 THE FEMINIST MAJORITY FOUNDATION, 1991 RU 486 and Breast Cancer, No.1, at 1 
[hereinafter Breast Cancer). 
84 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XVI, No. I 
patients after the failure of all other known treatments. 17 The 
same study demonstrated that RU 486 reduces pain from the 
growth of bone cancer cells. 18 Before the end of 1992, the Na-
tional Cancer Institute of Canada Clinical Trials Group intends 
to begin breast cancer trials using RU 486 at Queens University 
in Kingston, Ontario. 19 
RU 486 is equally promising in the treatment of a type of 
cancer known as Cushing's Syndrome.20 Treatments with the 
drug achieved complete regression and actual reversal of Cush-
ing's Syndrome in over half of the patients to whom it was ad-
ministered.21 Ongoing research also documents the efficacy of 
RU 486 in reducing the size of uterine fibroid tumors, the leading 
cause of hysterectomies.22 Moreover, the drug has potential for 
treating meningiomas,23 reducing pelvic pain in individuals suf-
17 G. Romieu et aI., The Anti-Progesterone RU 486 in Advanced Breast Cancer: Preliminary 
Clinical Trial, 74 BULL. CANCER 455 (1987). Dr. Romieu discovered that RU 486 affected 
tumors which had become resistant to anti-estrogen drugs such as tamoxifen. Id.; see also 
G.H. Bakker et aI., Treatment of Breast Cancer with Different Anti-Progestins: Preclinical and 
Clinical Studies, 37 J. STEROID BIOCHEMISTRY & MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 789 (1990). 
In the Netherlands, animal studies with RU 486 showed that the drug reduced breast 
cancer tumors as effectively as tamoxifen. Tumor sizes were further reduced by admin-
istering the drugs simultaneously. J. Klijn et aI., Anti-Progesterones, a New Form of Endocrine 
Therapy for Human Breast Cancer, 49 CANCER RES. 2851, 2853 (1989). 
18 Romieu, supra note 17, at 456. 
19 RU 486 Report, supra note 2, at 1. The trial will include fifteen women with evidence 
of disease recurrence and is the first to involve patients who have not been treated with 
any other hormones or drugs. Id. 
20 Cushing's Syndrome is caused by an overproduction of cortisol, a natural glucocor-
ticoid hormone. RU 486 is an antiglucocorticoid, so that it binds to the glucocorticoid 
receptors in the body. Treatments with RU 486 thus prevent cortisol from binding to the 
glucocorticoid receptors. THE FEMINIST MAJORITY FOUNDATION, 1991 RU 486 and Cushing's 
Syndrome, No.1, at 1. 
21 Import Ban, supra note 7, at 10. Efficacy was 100 percent for five of the eight individuals 
who were gravely ill with inoperable tumors caused by the disease. The condition of these 
five individuals continued to improve while treatment with RU 486 continued. The side 
effects observed with RU 486 were mild or transient in nature. Id. (testimony of George 
P. Chrousos, M.D., Senior Investigator and Section Chief, Pediatric Endocrinology, Na-
tional Institute of Child Health and Human Development, National Institutes of Health). 
22 Ana Murphy et aI., Responses of Uterine Fibroids to the Anti-Progesterone RU 486: A Pilot 
Study, Paper Presented at Annual Meeting of the American Fertility Society (Oct. 21-24, 
1991). 
23 S. Grunberg et aI., Treatment of Unresectable Meningiomas with the Antiprogesterone Agent 
Mifepristone, 74 J. OF NEUROSURGERY 861, 861 (1991). During 1992, the National Cancer 
Institute began trials with RU 486 for meningioma involving 200 patients. RU 486 Report, 
supra note 2, at 2. 
1993) RU 486 85 
fering from endometriosis,24 inducing labor,25 countering depres-
sion,26 and offsetting the effects of high blood pressureP Re-
searchers are also investigating RU 486 as a treatment for 
Alzheimer's disease.28 
In addition, RU 486 is being investigated abroad as a once-a-
month contraceptive pill and as a "morning after" pill. 29 Fur-
thermore, foreign use demonstrates its possible efficacy as a treat-
ment for osteoporosis and glaucoma, to aid childbirth, and to 
lessen the need for Caesarian sections.30 Finally, researchers be-
lieve RU 486 may be beneficial for burns, wounds, high blood 
pressure, and even AIDS.3! 
It is important to note, however, that the medical community 
is not unanimously in favor of RU 486. Three researchers who 
characterize themselves as pro-choice feminists published a com-
prehensive review of the studies documenting RU 486.32 Ray-
mond, Klein, and Dumble are highly critical of the lack of long-
24 L.M. Kettel et a!., Endocrine Responses to Long-term Administration of the Anti-Progesterone 
RU 486 in Patients with Pelvic Endometriosis, 56 FERTILITY & STERILITY 402, 404 (1991). 
25 C. Baton et a!., Progesterone Antagonist for Labor Induction at Term: A Double Blind Study: 
RU 486 (Mifepristone) Versus Placebo, Paper Presented at Annual Meeting of the American 
Fertility Society (Oct. 21-24, 1991). 
26 The Effect of the Federal Ban of RU 486 on Medical Research, New Drug Development, and 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers: Hearing Before the Small Business Subcommittee on Regulation, 
Business Opportunities & Energy, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (July 28, I 992)[hereinafter RU 486 
and Medical Research)(testimony submitted by Bernard J. Carroll, M.D., Ph.D., Professor, 
Department of Psychiatry, Duke University Medical Center). 
27Id. (testimony submitted by Charles O. Wattlington, M.D., Ph.D., Professor of Med-
icine, Division of Endocrinology & Metabolism, Medical College of Virginia, Virginia 
Commonwealth University). 
28 The NYU Medical Center conducted a six-week clinical trial during the summer of 
1992 to study what effect RU 486 has on individuals suffering from Alzheimer's disease. 
RU 486 Report, supra note 2, at 2. 
29 Researchers at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) reported results of animal 
trials suggest that RU 486 "would have significant advantages over the birth control pill" 
as an oral contraceptive for women who are over 35 and/or smoke. M. Batista et a!., Daily 
Administration of the Progesterone Antagonist RU 486 Prevents Implantation in the Cycling Guinea 
Pig, 165 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 82, 82 (1991); see also RU 486" Shows Promise" 
For Use as a Contraceptive, July 31, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AbrtRpt File. 
A study in Edinburgh, Scotland revealed that RU 486 is highly effective as a "morning 
after" contraceptive for up to 72 hours after intercourse. Anna Glasier et a!., Mifepristone 
(RU 486) Compared With High-Dose Estrogen and Progestogen for Emergency Postcoital Contra-
ception, 327: IS NEW ENG. J. MED. 1041, 1043 (Oct. 8, 1992). 
30 RU 486 and Medical Research, supra note 26, at 2 (testimony of Marjorie Braude, M.D., 
on behalf of the American Medical Women's Association). 
31 Kotulak, supra note 10, at Cl. 
32 JANICE G. RAYMOND ET AL., RU 486: MISCONCEPTIONS, MYTHS AND MORALS 41 (1991). 
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term follow-up studies to evaluate the effects of RU 486 and 
prostaglandins on menstrual cycles and later pregnancies. 33 An-
other outspoken critic of RU 486 is Richard Glasow, education 
director for the National Right to Life Committee.34 Glasow has 
legitimately focused on the fact that current use of RU 486 as an 
abortifacient requires strict medical supervision; its use in Third 
World countries, where facilities often are not available, therefore 
could be potentially very dangerous. 35 
Regardless of its medical benefits or potential drawbacks, the 
use of RU 486 as an abortifacient suggests a variety of moral and 
ethical dilemmas. RU 486 completely defines, and redefines, the 
abortion debate. 36 The highly-politicized, embittered, and even 
hysterical debate surrounding abortion has been discussed exten-
sively elsewhere,37 and is not intended to be the focus of this 
Note. Rather, the analysis considers RU 486 within the context 
of gender-specific concerns. While RU 486 highlights issues of 
reproductive control, the drug has clear implications for a wide 
array of women's health concerns. 
II. DECISIONS INVOLVING RU 486: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
A. The Regulatory Environment 
Drug approval procedures are one indication of a nation's 
approach to medical risks and benefits. 38 Describing standard 
33Id. at 76. 
34 He claims that "there's no proven use for RU 486 except to kill babies," and that 
potential medical uses have been "exaggerated as a smokescreen." Kotulak, supra note 10, 
at Cl. 
35 RU 486 in Foreign Markets, supra note 1, at 9 (testimony of Richard Glasow, Ph.D., 
Education Director, National Right to Life Committee). 
36 Both sides of the current U.S. debate focus on the right to privacy. The use of RU 
486 as an abortifacient makes the choice to have an abortion a confidential matter between 
a woman and her doctor, rather than a decision communicated to the public by the 
woman's visit to an abortion clinic. The drug thus cuts to the essence of the right to 
privacy and alters "the very nature of the abortion issue by placing the question of early 
abortion beyond the control of our courts and legislatures." See Jane Cohen, Review Essay, 
Comparison-Shopping in the Marketplace of Rights, 98 YALE L.J. 1235, 1256 (1989). 
37 Commentary and analysis of the abortion debate spans well over twenty years. For 
recent in-depth discussions of abortion and the intense legal and political controversy, 
see, for example, LAWRENCE TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1991); MAR-
LENE FRIED, ED., FROM ABORTION TO REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM (1990); RUTH BADER GINS-
BURG, CONTESTED LIVES (1989); MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN 
LAW: AMERICAN FAILURES, EUROPEAN CHALLENGES (1987). 
38 John Patrick Dillman, Prescription Drug Approval and Terminal Diseases: Desperate Times 
Require Desperate Measures, 44 VAND. L. REV. 925, 925 (1991). 
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drug approval procedures in the United States and Great Britain 
does not, however, immediately suggest any substantial diver-
gences in approach.39 Both countries employ a multi-phase licen-
sing scheme for any new drug.40 The first step by a company 
seeking a license is preclinical investigations and animal testing, 
followed by clinical testing in several phases with increasingly 
larger samples of the population, and ending with review by 
either the FDA or the CSM.41 While the procedures are similar, 
certain phases of the U.S. process are more time-consuming: 
preclinical investigations for the FDA take twice as long as the 
CSM, and the FDA employs a lengthier review process after the 
completion of clinical trials. 42 Shorter testing and review periods 
in Great Britain may be explained by the fact that the FDA 
requires domestic data be used in conjunction with foreign data, 
whereas the CSM more frequently uses foreign data for both 
preclinical and clinical testing.43 
The procedural differences between the two drug approval 
processes are the result of markedly dissimilar perspectives. The 
exacting standards and more extensive testing required by the 
FDA focus on establishing safety prior to marketing.44 The FDA's 
approach is more laissez-faire, as it will not unilaterally undertake 
investigation of any drug that is not already licensed.45 Instead, 
39 Harvey Teff, Drug Approval in England and the United States, 33 AM. J. CaMP. L. 567, 
576 (1985). 
4°Id. 
41 See Dillman, supra note 38, at 928-31. In Phase I testing, the goal is to collect basic 
data on the safety of the new drug by conducting tests on a small group of healthy subjects 
(typically 100 or fewer). Phase II testing focuses on the effectiveness and short-term side 
effects of the new drug by conducting tests on several hundred patients who are divided 
into treatment and control groups. Phase III testing can involve thousands of patients 
over a period of years and is intended to establish the drug's efficacy, long-term side 
effects, and optimal dosage levels. E.g. Beth Myers, The Food and Drug Administration's 
Experimental Drug Approval System: Is it Good for Your Health?, 28 Hous. L. REV. 309, 320 
(1991). 
42 Dillman, supra note 38, at 932. The FDA's clinical testing begins with a Notice of 
Claimed Investigational Exemption for New Drug (IND). When all three steps of testing 
are completed by the manufacturer, the results are submitted for FDA review in the form 
of a New Drug Application (NDA). See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (a)(i),(b)(1),(c)(I), and (d). 
43Id. at 928, 932. 
44 Teff, supra note 39, at 579. For example, the requirement of randomized controlled 
clinical trials in Phase III is very costly and time-consuming. This requirement reflects an 
attempt to ascertain all possible side effects and longer-term consequences of the proposed 
drug. See id. at 576, 584. 
45 Wendy K. Mariner, Equitable Access to Biomedical Advances: Getting Beyond the Rights 
Impasse, 21 CONN. L. REV. 571, 602 (1989). 
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drug manufacturers begin preclinical testing of drugs before ap-
plying to the FDA and initiating the U.S. licensing process.46 
Critics frequently charge, however, that the FDA is responsive to 
political pressures.47 In contrast, the CSM is viewed as being more 
objective.48 Expert apolitical committees assume a central role in 
the decision to approve a particular drug, thereby operating in-
dependently of the pharmaceutical market.49 The CSM's auton-
omous approach arguably minimizes the influences of govern-
ment and industry by relying on experts' independent judgments 
rather than on test results submitted by the drug's manufac-
turer. 50 Also, while the FDA utilizes restrictive premarketing ap-
proval methods, the CSM monitors adverse reactions after licen-
sing a drug.51 Postmarketing surveillance by the CSM is premised 
on the assumption that, even with extensive premarket testing, 
serious rare side effects will not become apparent until a larger 
population has used the drug. 52 
Postmarket monitoring of drugs is well-suited to Great Britain 
because of the structure and size of the society. 53 In particular, 
the British centralized health care system and societal attitudes 
regarding the medical profession facilitate postmarketing sur-
veillance.54 The National Health Service (NHS) enables the CSM 
to follow-up a drug after its distribution by collecting data from 
every doctor prescribing the drug. 55 The practice of monitoring 
a drug after approval also presupposes a degree of public trust 
in the medical profession. 56 In contrast, the FDA's stringent pre-
46 Import Ban, supra note 7, at 36. 
47Id. at 934; see also D. Benac, FDA Officials Subpoenaed in Insider Trading Probe, THE 
TENNESSEAN, Apr. 4, 1991, at E4. 
48 Dillman, supra note 38, at 934. 
49 Teff, supra note 39, at 581. The CSM is not well known outside the medical profession. 
It consists of 19 eminent experts, 14 of whom occupy academic positions. !d. 
50Id. But see UK Drug Advisory Bodies Declare Industry Links, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1989, 
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Pbnws File (annual reports from drug advisory bodies 
in Great Britain reveal that 13 of 21 members of the CSM had financial interests in 
pharmaceutical companies in 1989). 
51 Teff, supra note 39, at 579. 
52 !d. Potential harm is minimized by limiting the right to prescribe certain drugs to 
hospital pharmacies or to particular specialists. In comparison, the FDA does not devote 
much time to postapproval monitoring so that re·evaluation, recall, or relabeling are 
unlikely. Dillman, supra note 38, at 929. 
53 Teff, supra note 39, at 579. 
54 See id. 
55 Dillman, supra note 38, at 932-33. 
56 Teff, supra note 39, at 582. R. v. Ethical Comm. of St. Mary's Hosp. demonstrates that 
at least the judiciary in Great Britain defers to clinical judgments. I F.L.R. 512 (Q.B. 
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marketing approval process and the V.S. tort liability system are 
in ter -related. 5 7 
The divergent policies of the FDA and CSM also reflect differ-
ences in government accountability. 58 The V.S. government views 
its role as a trustee of official information for the public. 59 As a 
result, the FDA's rule-making activities are more elaborate and 
formal than those of the CSM.60 Continual congressional over-
sight of the FDA reveals a greater degree of government account-
ability in the V nited States and further contributes to adminis-
trative complexity.61 The CSM, in comparison, is able to remain 
more autonomous than the FDA because the British place less 
emphasis on government accountability.62 The British govern-
1988). That case involved a challenge to a doctor's decision to refuse an applicant for in 
vitro fertilization. The court held that the doctor-patient relationship is beyond the scope 
of administrative law, and that clinics have the right to deny provision of treatments like 
in vitro fertilization when "information indicates the need to do so." Id. at 520, 524. 
57 See Dillman, supra note 38, at 948. Teff comments that a regulator has "little or 
nothing to lose by refusing, or at least delaying, the grant of a license, and everything to 
lose if [a] thalidomide [is approved]." Teff, supra note 39, at 591. Thalidomide was a 
remedy for morning sickness developed in the 1950s which caused thousands of serious 
birth defects in Great Britain. Id.; see also Myers, supra note 41, at 320. 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers in the United States must always consider the threat of 
liability exposure. Silicone breast implants are a recent example. On January 6,1992, the 
FDA imposed a moratorium on the sale of breast implants after documents revealed the 
implants were marketed before the results from animal testing were complete. Deborah 
Mesce, Breast Implant Firm Combats Charges of Insufficient Testing, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 14, 
1992, at 3. Dow Corning Wright, the largest maker of silicone gel breast implants, 
subsequently withdrew the devices from the market and no longer manufactures silicone 
gel implants. Marlene Cimons, Dow Coming to Stop Making Gel Implants, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 
19, 1992, at AI. 
One market participant, however, stated that, contrary to popular belief, product lia-
bility represents a cost of substantially less than one percent of sales. RU 486 and Medical 
Research, supra note 26, at 2 (testimony of R.L. Mackenzie, Chairman & CEO, Gyno-
pharma, Inc.). 
58 See Teff, supra note 39, at 580. 
59 See id. 
60 See id. at 579. There is no British equivalent to the requirements for a notice and 
comment period or publication in the Federal Register. See id. at 580. 
61 The forty or so annual formal hearings on the drug industry are more exacting and 
intrusive than comparable British procedures. Id. at 581. Yet, there are charges that even 
such a closely monitored approach does not prevent dangerous products from reaching 
consumers. The House Energy and Commerce subcommittee staff issued a report entitled 
"Filthy Food, Dubious Drugs and Defective Devices: the Legacy of FDA's Antiquated 
Statute," recommending that the FDA be granted the authority to order recalls of products 
or the destruction of goods that risk human or animal health, the power to grant sub-
poenas when products are being investigated, the ability to enter and inspect places of 
business when criminal activity is suspected, and the ability to set civil penalties for 
violations. FDA Can't Stop Bad Products, Report Claims, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 7, 1991, at 19. 
62 Teff, supra note 39, at 580. 
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ment restricts access to official information by claiming ownership 
of public information.63 
The results of such differing perspectives and policy assump-
tions are tangible.64 It is undisputed that there is a drug lag in 
the United States-new drugs reach the market more slowly in 
the United States than in other sophisticated drug-producing 
nations.65 Critics in both countries have recommended modifi-
cations to the drug approval systems.66 In Great Britain, the CSM 
employed an exemption scheme to permit earlier clinical trials in 
some cases and more narrowly tailored data requirements for 
clinical testing to reduce unnecessary delays.67 In the United 
States, proposals for extensive change are finally being seriously 
considered.68 Regulators suggested a reduction in product licen-
sing time and methods to control costs involved in developing 
drugs.69 Reform may not occur anytime soon, though, because 
the FDA may delay adopting the proposals. 70 Furthermore, some 
lawmakers have expressed opposition to what they see as an 
attempt to disempower the FDA's watchdog role. 7l 
B. Health Care Systems 
Regulatory decisions, particularly those made by the FDA or 
the CSM, naturally reflect the nation's overall conception of 
63 There is no dialogue with the public in Great Britain and as of yet, no freedom of 
information legislation to encourage it. Id. 
64 See Dillman, supra note 38, at 934-35. 
65Id. at 936. 
66 See id. at 940-47. 
67 Medicines Act (Exemption from Licenses) (Clinical Trials), 1981, No. 164 (Eng.). 
68 Negotiations between the FDA, the Japanese Ministry of Health and Welfare, and 
the European Commission began the harmonization of drug industry regulations. Paul 
Abrahams, A Tricky Balancing Actfor Regulators, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1991, at 19. 
69Id. Specifically, the new plan calls for the FDA to shorten current review and approval 
times of all drugs by contracting organizations outside the government to review new 
drugs, and by recognizing foreign tests to avoid duplicate tests on animals and humans. 
!d. 
70 The FDA's attitude seems to be the main institutional obstacle to harmonization; it 
warned that it could take more than eighteen months to adopt the proposals. See Abra-
hams, supra note 68. 
71 Marlene Cimons, Three Lawmakers Seek to Delay Effort to Accelerate FDA Drug Approval, 
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1991, at A23. Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA), chairman of the 
Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, and Reps. John Dingell (D-Mich), chair-
man of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, and Henry Waxman (D-CA), 
chairman of the Energy Panel's Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, support 
the plan to speed new drugs for life-threatening and other serious conditions, but they 
questioned the need to accelerate the process for all other drugs. Id. 
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health care.72 Although the United States and Great Britain have 
comparable cultures, their health care policies differ vastly.73 The 
British system is noted for being more equitable and more suc-
cessful at containing costS. 74 The values most closely associated 
with British health care policies are equality, economic security, 
and social solidarity.75 The U.S.health care system, on the other 
hand, exhibits the underlying cultural values of individualism, 
private property, and free trade.76 The British tend to construe 
liberty as freedom from physiological problems and the financial 
burdens that accompany them, whereas U.S. citizens are more 
likely to define liberty as freedom from government interven-
tion. 77 
There are complaints of administrative waste and mismanage-
ment in both countries, but figures suggest that the U.S. health 
care bureaucracy has been growing faster in size and influence 
without providing comparable benefits.78 The United States 
spends more per year per person for health care than any other 
country.79 In fact, Great Britain spends one-half as much as the 
U.S. and maintains comparable mortality and morbidity rates.80 
72 See generally Mariner, supra note 45. 
73 See infra notes 74-89 and accompanying text. 
74 Christopher Potter & Janet Porter, American Perceptions of the British National Health 
Service: Five Myths, 14 J. HEALTH POL., POL'y & L. 341, 342 (1989). 
75 Charles Lockhart, Values and Policy Conceptions of Health Policy Elites in the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic of Germany, 6 J. HEALTH POL., POL'y & L. 98, 
100 (1981) ("The way the British provide for their citizens' health care needs has created 
a public program that enables a broad segment of the population to feel they share 
something worthwhile. "). 
76 Potter & Porter, supra note 74, at 343. Lockhart notes that individuals active in the 
formulation of health care policy in the United States were more likely than their British 
counterparts to isolate health policy from other aspects of society, such as housing, 
employment, working conditions, and the environment. Lockhart, supra note 75, at 101. 
77 Lockhart, supra note 75, at 103. 
78 John Lister, The Politics of Medicine in Britain and the United States, 315 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 168, 170 (1986). In 1991, European health expenditures accounted for between 7 
and 9 percent of each country's gross national product, while in the United States the 
figure was more than 12 percent. Abrahams, supra note 68, at 19. It would seem that the 
United Kingdom is on the low end of the European figure: in 1986 it was reported that 
health care costs accounted for 6 percent of the gross national product in Great Britain. 
David Himmelstein & Steffie Wolhander, Cost Without Benefit: Administrative Waste in U.S. 
Health Center, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 441, 442 (1986). 
79 The Health Care Crisis, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 7, 1992, at 18. 
80 Potter & Porter, supra note 74, at 363; see also Lister, supra note 78, at 169. Dr. 
Allukian has testified to the same effect: "Our country is currently spending over $660 
billion a year for health services, more than any other nation in the world. Yet ... we 
have dropped from fifth to twenty-second in our infant mortality standing .... " Import 
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Commentators attribute Great Britain's relative efficiency to its 
centralized health care system.8l 
The British NHS offers every citizen comprehensive health 
services free at the time of use.82 Individuals do not pay a fee for 
services; rather, the government directly provides financial sup-
port.83 Most hospitals, clinics, ambulances, and laboratories are 
owned by the government, and all NHS staff are on the govern-
ment payrol1.84 Yet, the NHS is nationalized health care and 
differs from "socialized medicine" in that there is both public and 
private ownership of facilities and fairly strong professional or-
ganizations.8s Health care in Great Britain is best described as a 
state-supported consumer good.86 
The United States stands in sharp contrast to Great Britain as 
one of the only industrialized countries without a national health 
insurance program.87 The current U.S. alternatives to compre-
hensive funding by the NHS are Medicare, for individuals who 
are over age sixty-five, and Medicaid, for individuals who meet 
certain income guidelines. The crucial distinction between the 
two systems is the American view that health care is not a right, 
but a consumer good which is purchased through the free mar-
ket. 88 Means of payment for medical care in the United States-
private or government insurance and personal financial re-
serves-provide an impetus for the use of elaborate and expen-
sive methods of treatment.89 Critics identify the major problem 
with this approach as a lack of concern with efficiency or equal 
distribution.90 
Ban, supra note 7, at 29 (testimony of Myron Allukian, Jr., DDS, MPH, Immediate Past 
President, American Public Health Association). 
81 See generally Potter & Porter, supra note 74, at 344-45. 
82 Lister, supra note 78, at 169. The NHS originated under the British Socialist Party 
and was officially established in 1946. The initial conception of health care was "an exercise 
in paternalistic social engineering ... to make the workforce healthier and thereby increase 
productivity." Potter & Porter, supra note 74, at 344-45. 
83 Potter & Porter, supra note 74, at 345. 
84Id. 
85Id. at 344. 
86Id. 
87 See Lockhart, supra note 75, at 101. 
88 !d. at 104. 
89 E.P. Steinberg et aI., X-Ray, CT and Magnetic Resonance Imagers, 313 NEW. ENG. J. 
MED. 863 (1985), quoted in Potter & Porter, supra note 74, at 353. 
90Id. 
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C. Governmental Decision-Making and RU 486 
l. Great Britain 
93 
RU 486 became available in Great Britain in July 1991 through 
the NHS.91 The CSM licensed RU 486 ten months after Roussel-
Uelaf submitted its application,92 although on average it takes a 
new drug 19 months to be granted a license for use in Great 
Britain.93 The short delay between the manufacturer's application 
and the licensing of RU 486 prompted accusations that Roussel-
Uelaf had "fast-tracked" the drug.94 As an abortifacient, RU 486 
currently costs slightly more than a surgical abortion.95 RU 486 
is used up through the ninth week of pregnancy,96 although its 
provision is subject to strict controls.97 
2. The U.S. Import Ban 
a. Background 
In the United States, the Import Ban on RU 486, officially 
referred to as Import Alert 66-47, is the first major policy state-
91 RU 486 in Foreign Markets, supra note 1, at 18-19. 
92 Roussel-Uelaf applied for a license in September 1990 and the CSM approved RU 
486 at the beginning of July 1991. "Abortion Pill" High on List for Licenses, THE INDEPEN-
DENT, Jan. 3, 1991, at Home News 2. 
93 Rowan Dore, Minister Pledges Tight Controls on Abortion Drug, July 23, 1991, available 
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Intl File. 
94 [d. Statement by Sir Bernard, a former health minister. Kenneth Hind (Lancashire 
W) responded to these charges by explaining to the House that the Health Department 
did not carry out any independent research on the drug. [d. 
95 [d. NHS surgical abortions currently cost £185, or approximately $323.00, whereas 
Roussel-Uelaf is currently selling the three tablets required for the treatment for £43, or 
approximately $75.00. Administrative and facility costs, however, make RU 486 more 
expensive than a surgical abortion. 
96 Interview with Dr. Louise Tryer, Gynecologist for Leona Benten, CNN,July 10,1992, 
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File. 
97 Celia Hall, Newly-licensed 'Abortion Pill' Subject to Strict Controls, THE INDEPENDENT, July 
4, 1991, at Home News 4. Supplies are not available to family doctors or over the counter. 
RU 486 may only be obtained by written request to the manufacturer from a named 
hospital or elinic purchaser, supported by the names of the consultants who will prescribe 
the drug to the patient. In addition, the drug will be tracked to every purchaser and 
subscriber by means of a coding system. !d. 
Critics of these controls elaim the law in Britain is too restrictive for proper use to be 
made of RU 486. Alliance, an umbrella organization for pro-choice groups, stated that 
by the time most women get an appointment with two doctors in a hospital it will be too 
late to use this method. Linda Jackson, Now Abortion By Pill, July 3, 1991, available in 
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Intl File. 
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ment regarding RU 486.98 Numerous changes in the FDA's reg-
ulatory scheme preceded, and in fact, provided the impetus for 
the Import Ban. In July 1988, the FDA instituted what it termed 
a temporary change in its policy regarding mail import of un-
tested drugs.99 Individuals suffering from AIDS or cancer were 
permitted to import small doses for personal use with the super-
vision of their physician. 100 In September 1988, the FDA made it 
clear that its policy on mail import of unauthorized drugs did 
not apply to RU 486. 101 
At that time, the FDA regularly issued permits for medical 
research with RU 486 because it concluded in November 1988 
that the drug was reasonably safe.102 On February 1, 1989, the 
FDA extended its temporary policy regarding mail import of 
AIDS-related and cancer-related drugs; the agency created the 
personal use exception by revising its Regulatory Procedures 
Manual (RPM).103 On May 5, 1989, Congressmen Robert K. 
Dornan, Henry Hyde, and John LaFalce sent a letter to the then-
Commissioner of the FDA, complaining of the FDA's failure to 
bar RU 486 from this personal use exception. 104 Within two 
98 Import Ban, supra note 7, at 2. 
99 Benten v. Kessler, No. CV-92-3161, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10516, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. 
July 14, 1992). 
100Id. 
101 Import Alert 66-813, cited in Benten v. Kessler, No. CV-92-3161, 1992 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 10516, application to vacate stay, app. A, (No. A-40), July 15, 1992, available in 
LEXIS, Genfed Library, Extra File. 
102 Diane Walker, the FDA's Consumer Safety Officer, stated in a letter dated November 
28, 1988 that the FDA determined RU 486 to be reasonably safe. Import Ban, supra note 
7, at 43. 
103 The relevant part of the Regulatory Procedure Manual (RPM) states as follows: 
In deciding whether to exercise discretion to allow personal shipments of d~ugs 
or devices, FDA personnel should consider a more permissive policy in the 
following situations: 
when the intended use is appropriately identified, such use is not for treatment 
of a serious condition, and the product is not known to represent a significant 
health risk; or when (1) the intended use is unapproved and for a serious 
condition for which effective treatment may not be available domestically, either 
through commercial or clinical means; (2) there is no known commercialization 
or promotion to persons residing in the United States ... ; (3) the product is 
considered not to represent an unreasonable risk; and (4) the individual seeking 
to import the product affirms in writing that it is for the patient's own personal 
use .... 
RPM 9-71-30(C). 
104 Benten v. Kessler, No. CV-92-3161, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10156, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. 
July 14, 1992). The legislators stated, inter alia, that "the U.S. government should not be 
involved in abetting abortion." [d. 
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weeks, the FDA also received a letter from Senator Jesse Helms. 105 
Senator Helms' letter demanded an immediate ban on RU 486, 
citing the risks of complications and the probability of mail order 
purchase of the drug. 106 Nineteen days later, the FDA issued 
Import Alert 66-47.107 Agency documents supporting the Import 
Ban closely track the actual language of the legislators' letters. 108 
No notice and comment procedure followed the change in pol-
icy. 109 
b. Effect 
FDA Import Alert 66-47 directs customs officials to 
"[a]utomatically detain all shipments of unapproved abortifacient 
drugs" to prevent unsupervised use or clandestine distribution. 110 
The Import Ban does not directly prohibit research on RU 486, 
as most scientists in the United States have been given exemptions 
to continue receiving supplies of the drug. III The FDA intended 
to permit ongoing research with RU 486 by issuing permits for 
investigation. ll2 The Import Ban, has been criticized as adversely 
affecting critical research unrelated to abortion which requires 
supplies of RU 486.113 
105 Import Ban, supra note 7, at 44. 
106 !d. 
107Id. 
108Id. 
109 Benten v. Kessler, No. CV-92-3161, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10156, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. 
July 14, 1992). 
110 Import Ban, supra note 7, at 45-46. While the Import Ban does not specifically identify 
RU 486, Dr. Sobel, the FDA's Director of the Metabolism and Endocrine Drug Products 
Division, testified that he did not know of any other compounds to which this ban could 
apply. Ronald Cheesemore, the FDA's Associate Commissioner of Regulatory Affairs, 
testified that the Import Ban was issued in anticipation of a black market, despite the fact 
that the FDA had no evidence that RU 486 had been used outside the tightly controlled 
circumstances imposed by Roussel-Uclaf. Id. at 37. 
III Dr. Sobel testified that any scientist would be able to receive an IND from the FDA, 
so that supplies of RU 486 could be imported. !d. at 39 (testimony of Solomon Sobel, 
M.D., Director, Division of Metabolism and Endocrine Drug Products). 
112Id. at 37. 
m Numerous studies on RU 486 slowed down or ceased entirely after June 1989. Id. 
at 2. The Subcommittee on Regulation, Business Opportunities, and Energy found that 
of the thirteen clinical trials listed as "current" by the FDA, only five appeared to be truly 
active. The Chair of the Subcommittee explained that "[t]he remainder [of the clinical 
trials] have been stalled, primarily by the manufacturer's decision to withdraw RU 486 
from the trials, or the researcher's concern that this drug has become so politicized that 
working with it can have damaging professional repercussions." RU 486 and Medical 
Research, supra note 26, at 2. 
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Research is impeded primarily because the manufacturer, 
Roussel-Uelaf, refuses to export RU 486 to the United States. 114 
Some scientists believe the Import Ban constitutes a significant 
deterrent to Roussel-Uelaf's decision not to apply for a license to 
distribute RU 486 in the United States. ll5 Indeed, the American 
Medical Association and the American Society for the Advance-
ment of Science recently passed resolutions condemning the "hos-
tile political elimate" that has almost completely locked the drug 
out of U.S. research institutions. ll6 Moreover, given the continu-
ing uncertainty over whether abortion will remain legal in the 
United States, Roussel-Uelafis reluctant to invest time and money 
in a market which might soon be eliminated. ll7 
3. Benten v. Kessler 
On July 1, 1992 Leona Benten attempted to import RU 486 
under the FDA's personal use exemption. ll8 Benten and her 
physician notified U.S. officials when and where they would be 
returning with the drug; customs officials at Kennedy Interna-
tional Airport subsequently confiscated Benten's RU 486 pills. ll9 
Benten brought action pursuant to the Administrative Proce-
dures Act, 120 to enjoin enforcement of the FDA ban on the import 
of RU 486. 121 She elaimed that the FDA illegally promulgated 
the ban on RU 486. 122 The district court characterized the action 
114 ld. at 2. 
115 Dr. Horwitz believes the "import alert has a chilling effect on RU 486 research in 
this country and ... it is not just a question of importing a drug like this into the United 
States, but also a question of American pharmaceutical manufacturers developing similar 
drugs in this country." ld. at 19. 
It is interesting to note that the generic drug firm Apotex Inc. stated it would produce 
a copy of RU 486 if Roussel-Uelaf would only grant it the rights. Allan Thompson, Apotex 
Seeks Right to Copy French Abortion Pill, TORONTO STAR, July 29, 1992, at F3. In response, 
Dr. Andre Ulmann, a spokesperson for Roussel-Uelaf, said that Roussel-Uelaf would be 
interested in hearing from Apotex because his company has already tried unsuccessfully 
to find a U.S. company to buy the rights to RU 486. ld. 
116 Kotulak, supra note 10, at Cl. 
117 RU 486: Manufacturer Has "No Plans" to Seek U.S. Approval, July 28, 1992, available 
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AbrtRpt File (expressing the opinion that after the Benten case, 
Roussel-Uelaf may be more wary than ever about seeking FDA approval for RU 486). 
118 US Woman Challenges Ban on Abortion Pill, BOSTON GLOBE, July 2, 1992, at 3. 
119 ld. 
120 Adminstrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 706 (2)(A) (1988); 21 C.F.R. § 10.70 
(1988). 
121 Benten v. Kessler, No. CV-92-3161, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10156, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. 
July 14, 1992). 
122ld. at *2. 
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as "a lawsuit waiting to happen"123 and termed the FDA's treat-
ment of RU 486 "arbitrary and capricious."124 
Regarding the personal use exemption, "no notice was given 
of the agency's [FDA's] intent to adopt this major revision in the 
agency's regulatory stance towards unapproved drugs, nor was 
comment invited either before or after it was adopted."125 The 
district court judge found that the FDA's decision to ban RU 486 
was not based on "any bonafide concern for the safety of the 
users of the drug."126 Rather, the Import Alert much more likely 
resulted from "political considerations having no place in FDA 
decisions on health and safety."127 
The FDA argued that, notwithstanding the legitimacy of its 
policy, Benten had no right to import RU 486. 128 Moreover, the 
FDA asserted that the Import Alert did not impose new duties 
on the agency.129 The district court held, however, that the Feb-
ruary 1989 revision of the RPM created Benten's right to a case-
by-case discretionary decision by the FDA regarding her request 
to import RU 486 for her personal use. 130 
Although the district court ordered the FDA to immediately 
release the impounded dosage of RU 486,131 later that same day 
a three-judge appellate panel stayed the lower court's injunction 
against the seizure. 132 Benten's attorneys filed an emergency ap-
peal with the Supreme Court that night. 133 In a two-paragraph 
123Id. at * 1. 
124 Judge Sifton wrote that the record "reveals a history of political and bureaucratic 
timidity mixed with well-intentioned blundering." Id. 
125Id. at *12. 
126Id. at *14. A request made pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act revealed 
that no documents exist in the FDA's files which explain any factual basis for the change 
in policy. Id. at *27-28. 
127Id. at *15. Judge Sifton commented that counsel for the FDA "went out of his way 
to offer to return the drug to the plaintiff for use in some other country, a somewhat 
paradoxical position given the safety concerns defendants have voiced in other contexts." 
Id. at *18. 
128 !d. at *23. 
129Id. 
130Id. The court also stated that the nondiscretionary detention of RU 486 established 
by the FDA ban did in fact create a new duty on FDA personnel. Id. 
131Id. at *28,*30. 
132 US High Court to Rule on Ban of Abortion Pill, BOSTON GLOBE, July 15, 1992, at 3. 
133 Id. Justice Thomas oversees cases from the Second Circuit. When he received Ben-
ten's petition for an emergency appeal, Justice Thomas requested an opinion from the 
Justice Department. The Bush administration argued that federal judges do not have the 
power to overturn the FDA ban because agency officials were enforcing a clearly valid 
statute. US Asks Court to Back Ban on Abortion Pill, BOSTON GLOBE, July 17, 1992, at 3. 
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opinion, the Supreme Court denied Benten's application to vacate 
the Court of Appeals stay.134 The per curiam opinion simply 
stated that the petitioners failed to demonstrate a substantial 
likelihood of success on the merits. 135 
4. Legislative Initiatives 
a. Federal 
In February 1992, Representative Ron Wyden (D-OR) intro-
duced a bill to make the FDA Import Alert ineffective with re-
spect to RU 486. 136 Officially referred to as the RU 486 Regula-
tory Fairness Act, H.R. 875, Wyden's bill had sixty-one sponsors 
at the end of the summer of 1992.137 Senator Alan Cranston (D-
CA) subsequently proposed a Senate version of Wyden's bil1. 138 
Late in July 1992, Representative Patricia Schroeder (D-CO) in-
troduced a bill specifically to reverse the Supreme Court's action 
in Benten v. Kessler and permit Leona Benten to take RU 486. 139 
After the Court's decision, however, Benten had only a few days 
remaining in which she could safely use RU 486. As anticipated, 
Schroeder's legislation did not receive the necessary votes in time. 
Wyden's bill is still pending. 
b. State Legislation and Advocacy 
In 1991, the New Hampshire legislature passed a resolution to 
make the state a test site for RU 486. 140 California passed an 
134 Benten v. Kessler, 112 S.Ct. 2929,1992 U.S. LEXIS 4756, (July 17, 1992) (per 
curiam). 
135Id. Justices B1ackmun and Stevens dissented. Justice Stevens dissented on the 
grounds that, in accordance with the FDA's personal use exemption, the only legitimate 
governmental interest in seizing Benten's RU 486 is the interest in avoiding significant 
health risks. He believed the FDA did not demonstrate this interest and that its stated 
reason for the seizure did not justify the "burdensome consequences" on Benten. Id. at 
*2-3. 
136 Bills and Resolutions Introduced February 6, The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Feb. 
8, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Lglnew File. 
137 RU 486 Report, supra note 2, at 2. 
138 The Senate legislation is S 2268. Bills and Resolutions Introduced February 26, The 
Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Feb. 28, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Lglnew 
File. 
139 David Lawsky, Bill Offered to Make French Abortion Drug Available, July 20, 1992, 
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Lglnew File. Rep. Schroeder explained that the "medical 
McCarthyism" of the FDA prompted her to introduce the legislation. RU 486 and Medical 
Research, supra note 26, at 2 (testimony of Rep. Patricia Schroeder (D-CO)). 
140 NH H.C.R. 11, Reg. Sess., (May 17, 1991). Gary Gilmore is the New Hampshire 
1993] RU 486 99 
identical resolution the following week. l41 A number of other 
states have now enacted similar legislation to encourage new re-
search with RV 486 and counteract the effects of the FDA's 
Import Ban. l42 In addition, numerous groups and organizations 
have expressed their support for research involving RV 486 and 
contacted the manufacturer directly.143 Over 3000 scientists and 
health professionals have now signed petitions to Roussel-Velaf 
and Hoescht, demanding that RV 486 be marketed in the Vnited 
States. 144 Moreover, a recent survey reveals that the general public 
state representative who sponsored the RU 486 resolution. The state legislature passed 
the legislation on May 5,1991. Voting on the resolution was 211 in favor and 130 against, 
and 14 in favor and 10 against in the state House of Representatives and the state Senate, 
respectively. Mr. Gilmore believes that the FDA's Import Ban is merely symbolic, and 
cannot be justified by any scientific reasons. He notes that the potential medical benefits 
of RU 486 convinced even representatives who are Catholic and strongly opposed to RU 
486 as an abortifacient of the importance of a resolution regarding testing. The public 
relations division of Roussel-Uelaf contacted Mr. Gilmore the day after the vote on the 
RU 486 resolution to confirm the results. Telephone Interview with Gary Gilmore, New 
Hampshire State Representative, (Sept. 20, 1991). 
141 CA A.J.R. 40, Reg. Sess., (May 21, 1991). 
142 The resolutions request Congress to rescind the Import Ban and/or authorize new 
elinical testing of RU 486 in the United States. AK H.J.R. 58, 17th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., 
(Jan. 14, 1992); FL S.R. 1102, Reg. Sess., (Jan. 14, 1992); HI S.C.R. 18, 16th Leg., Reg. 
Sess., (Jan. 23, 1992); KS H.R. 6020, 74th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., (Jan. 30, 1992); ME S.B. 
971, 115th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., (March 27, 1992); MN S.B. 1593, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess., 
(May 20, 1991); WI A.J.R. 106, 90th Leg., Reg. Sess., (Jan. 23, 1992). Contra RI S.B. 
2028, Reg. Sess., (Feb. 12, 1992) (prohibiting state from investing funds in companies or 
institutions which make loans to companies involved in manufacture, distribution, or sale 
of RU 486); LA S.B. 1069, 1990 Reg. Sess., (April 30, 1990) (prohibiting production, 
manufacture, distribution, and possession of RU 486). 
143 The American Medical Women's Association has focused on negotiations with Rous-
sel-Uelaf in an attempt to convince the company to make the drug available in the United 
States. RU 486 and Medical Research, supra note 26, at 3 (testimony of Marjorie Braude, 
M.D., on behalf of the American Medical Women's Association); see also American Jewish 
Congress Urges U.S. to Make RU 486 Available for Widespread Use, PR Newswire, Aug. 12, 
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File; The Endocrine Society Council, 
Resolution on RU 486 and Freedom of Scientific Inquiry, June 18, 1991, presented to Small 
Business Subcommittee on Regulation, Business Opportunities & Energy, July 28, 1992; 
Gale Scott, HHC [Health and Hospitals Corporation] Wants RU 486 Here, But Won't Boycott 
Maker, NEWS DAY, July 24, 1992, at 33; California: Medical Association Resolves to Import RU 
486, Mar. 20, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AbrtRpt File. 
In addition, New York City Mayor David Dinkins wrote to President Bush and thirty 
mayors nationwide, urging them to formally encourage Roussel-Uelaf to seek an appli-
cation for the import of RU 486. Lou Fintor, U.S. Lawmakers and Politicians Formalize 
Support for RU 486, 83 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 816, 818 (1991). 
144 RU 486 and Medical Research, supra note 26, at 8 (testimony of Eleanor Smeal, 
President, Feminist M~ority Foundation). 
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also strongly supports the availability of the drug in the United 
States. 145 
State and local advocacy for RU 486 may become a decisive 
factor in the ongoing debate over the drug. For example, the 
Center for Reproductive Law and Policy is researching the intra-
state mini-FDA in California as a potential mechanism for RU 
486 approval. 146 Approval of RU 486 in California would grant 
millions of women in that state access to the drug, as well as allow 
constitutional claims for equal protection by women in every 
other state. 147 
III. THE ROLE OF GENDER 
The controversy surrounding RU 486 is inextricably linked to 
the use for which it is currently licensed: abortion. 148 Since abor-
tion is an option available only to women, the debate over RU 
486 is inherently related to gender. 149 Gender is thus a factor in 
current decisions regarding RU 486 and should be considered in 
conjunction with the regulatory framework and health care sys-
tems in the United States and Great Britain. 
A. Gender-Specific Issues and Health Care 
The systematic exclusion of women from health care training 
until late in this century 150 has adversely affected research and 
treatment of women's health concerns in the United States and 
145 Harris Poll: Majority Support Availability of RU 486, Aug. 13, 1992, available in LEXIS, 
Nexis Library, AbrtRpt File. In a Harris poll conducted July 17-19, 1992, respondents 
were asked whether RU 486 should be available in the United States. Of 1,256 adults, 60 
percent answered yes, 36 percent replied no, and 4 percent were unsure. Respondents 
were also asked whether they were aware of the Supreme Court's decision in Benten v. 
Kessler. Of the 71 percent who had seen or heard of the ruling, 53 percent disapproved 
of the decision, 41 percent approved, and 6 percent were unsure. [d.; see also, e.g., Malcolm 
Gladwell, Supporters of Abortion Pill Divided on Court Challenge, WASH. POST, July 17, 1992, 
at A4. 
146 RU 486 and Medical Research, supra note 26, at 7 (testimony of Kathryn Kolbert, Vice 
President, Center for Reproductive Law and Policy). 
147 [d. 
148 See Mariner, supra note 45, at 600. 
149 See infra notes 174-75 and accompanying text. 
150 Camilla Parham, M.D., Family Practitioner, Address at the 1992 Empowering 
Women Forum Series: Invasion of the Body Snatchers (Controlling Women's Bodies, 
Punishing Women's Lives, Freeing Ourselves), at the Boston YWCA (Jan. 27, 1992) 
[hereinafter 1992 Empowering Women Forum Series]. 
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Great Britain. 151 During the nineteenth century, women were 
often the subjects of medical experimentation. 152 In the twentieth 
century, hysterectomies are the most frequently performed op-
eration, notwithstanding the fact that this expensive operation is 
unnecessary approximately 60 percent of the time. 153 Coronary 
heart disease is another example of how research conducted by 
and tailored to the needs of men can be inadequate when it comes 
to treating women. 154 
The political process in the United States also affects a variety 
of health care decisions, particularly through congressional con-
trol over funding. For example, contraceptive research has never 
been a priority for the federal government. 155 Yet, Medicaid has 
never stopped paying for the sterilization of women. 156 Likewise, 
the "ongoing prohibition against federal funding for abortion 
research [the "Hyde Amendment"157] ... implies that our society 
151 Eleanor Smeal believes that "exclusion of women from leadership pOSItIOns has 
resulted in the exclusion of women from the research agenda." RU 486 and Medical 
Research, supra note 26, at 9 (testimony of Eleanor Smeal, President, Feminist Majority 
Foundation); see also supra notes 118-19. 
152 Ruth Hubbard, Professor Emeritus in Biology at Harvard University, Board Member, 
Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts and Council for Responsible Genetics, Address at 
1992 Empowering Women Forum Series, supra note 150. 
153 [d. Hysterectomies are more common in the United States than in Canada or Great 
Britain. The American Medical Association recommends that a woman seek at least two 
opinions before a hysterectomy is performed. [d. 
154 Researchers found sex bias in the management of coronary heart disease of women 
and highlighted the problems of extrapolating male-generated research findings to 
women. Ayanian and Epstein describe such skewed medical practices as the "Yentl Syn-
drome." John Ayanian and Arnold Epstein, Differences in Use of Procedures Between Women 
and Men Hospitalized for Coronary Heart Disease, 325:4 NEW ENG.]' MED. 221 (1991); Richard 
M. Steingart et aI., Sex Difference in Management of Coronary Artery Disease, 325:4 NEW ENG. 
]. MED. 226 (1991) (physicians pursue less aggressive management approach for coronary 
disease in women despite greater cardiac disability in women). 
155 "In the United States today, the government spends less on contraceptive research 
in a single year than the Defense Department spends in 15 minutes." NEWSDAY, Jan. 12, 
1989, at 77, quoted in Valerie Cotler, The FDA, Contraception, and RU 486, 12 WOMEN'S 
RTS. L. REP. 123, 131 n.I52 (1990). Worldwide spending for methods of fertility regu-
lation has declined by nearly one-quarter since its peak in 1972. RU 486 in Foreign Markets, 
supra note 1, at 5 (testimony of Jacqueline Darroch Forrest, Ph.D., Vice President for 
Research, Alan Guttmacher Institute). 
156 Dr. Parham stated that while she was a practitioner in North Carolina during the 
late 1980s, she became aware that many women underwent tubal ligations on their twenty-
first birthdays-as soon as they became eligible for Medicaid payments for the operation. 
Informed consent did not exist: the women mistakenly believed that tubal ligation would 
be a more permanent form of birth control, rather than irreversible sterilization. She 
emphasized, however, that this situation is not unique to North Carolina. Camilla Parham, 
M.D., Address at 1992 Empowering Women Forum Series, supra note 150. 
157 The Hyde Amendment specifies that federal funding may not be used for abortions 
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has no interest in improving the safety of an operation that 1.6 
million citizens undergo each year."158 
The Supreme Court upheld the Hyde Amendment in 1980 in 
Harris v. McRae,159 stating: "it simply does not follow [from Roe 
v. Wade] that a woman's freedom of choice carries with it a con-
stitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself 
of the full range of protected choices."16o Herein lies the crucial 
difference: while the political process which controls Medicaid 
and Medicare creates a fragmented approach to health care, the 
British NHS provides the entitlement which Harris v. McRae den-
ies-a comprehensive medical plan to every citizen. 161 
The most recent affirmation of this piecemeal approach to 
health care in the United States is the so-called "gag rule" enun-
ciated in Rust v. Sullivan. 162 The "gag rule" is a regulation pro-
mulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services that 
forbids medical personnel in federally funded clinics from advis-
ing pregnant women about abortion. 163 The policy is contrary to 
the provision of health care in Great Britain, where necessary 
except where the life of the pregnant woman is endangered. H.R. 3839, 102d Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1991). The most recent appropriations rider on the Department of Health and 
Human Services spending is Sec. 203 of Title II of H.R. 3839. 
158 RU 486 in Foreign Markets, supra note 1, at 5 (testimony of David Grimes, Professor 
of Obstetrics and Gynecology and Preventative Medicine at the University of Southern 
California School of Medicine in Los Angeles). 
159 448 U.S. 297, 298 (1980). 
16°Id. at 316. Many women's advocates believe this decision eliminated any possibility 
of choice for many women, particularly women of color who are statistically in the lowest 
socioeconomic groups of U.S. society. Speech by Janet Mitchell, The Politics of RU-486, 
Norplant, and Depo-Provera: Expanding Women's Choices or Increasing Social Control?, Speech 
at Simmons College (Oct. 5, 1991). 
161 See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text. 
162 See III S.Ct. 1759, 1762 (1991). The Supreme Court rejected a facial challenge to 
regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Id. 
at 1771. 
163 The relevant provisions specified that any clinic receiving federal funds: (1) may not 
provide counselling concerning abortion or provide referral for abortion; (2) may not 
encourage, promote, or advocate abortion; and (3) must be organized so that the clinic's 
other medical services are physically and financially separated from prohibited abortion 
activities. Id. at 1765-66. 
In November 1991 and again on October 2,1992, the House of Representatives failed 
to override the presidential veto of legislation preventing the gag rule from taking effect. 
137 Congo Rec. H10856 (daily ed. Nov. 22,1991); Elizabeth Neuffer, House Sustains Bush 
on Abortion, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 3, 1992, at 3. The U.S. Court of Appeals, however, voted 
3-0 on November 3, 1992 to prevent the government from enforcing the HHS regulation. 
The Court of Appeals found a procedural violation in the Bush administration's failure 
to hold hearings on its modified version of the gag rule. Dick Lehr, Court Places Hold on 
Clinic "Gag Rule", BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 4, 1992, at 3. 
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medications or procedures do not depend on the type of proce-
dure nor on the recipient's financial status. 164 The British provi-
sion of comprehensive medical care, including funding for abor-
tion,165 suggests that-unlike the United States-reproductive 
decisions in Great Britain are viewed as a part of overall health 
care. 
B. Gender-Specific Issues and Equal Protection 166 
1. The British Model 
The British equivalent of American Equal Protection analysis 
is natural justice, the requirements of which are essentially un-
written rules of the common law. 167 Although the doctrine is often 
explained purely in terms of fairness, natural justice is not a 
natural law philosophy, and is more like administrative law. 168 
Natural justice evolved through the control exercised by central 
courts over courts of inferior jurisdiction and focuses primarily 
on procedural concerns. 169 The differences between the British 
approach and that of U.S. courts can be summed up as follows: 
The power of constitutional adjudication enjoyed by the Su-
preme Court and the inferior federal courts both emphasizes 
their central role in the political process and encourages 
greater flexibility in handling precedents than is the case in 
Great Britain. Moreover, the courts are perceived in the U.S. 
as a major forum for the determination of social standards 
in regulatory affairs, whereas in the U.K. such matters are 
164 See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text. 
165 Abortion Act of 1967, sec. 1, sched. 3, amended by Health Services Act of 1980, sched. 
1, para. 17; National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990, sec. 66(1), sched. 9, 
para. 8; see also Abortion Regulations of 1991, S.l. 1991, No. 499. 
166 The focus in this section is on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, rather than the right to privacy which has been traditionally linked to reproductive 
decisions and discussions of health care. It would seem that equal protection jurisprudence 
is the more forward-looking approach, given the Court's clear retreat from the doctrine 
of privacy. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Additionally, there has 
been a marked shift in the Court's ideological perspective since the landmark privacy 
cases were decided. 
167 EMLYN C.S. WADE AND ANTHONY W. BRADLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW 642 (1985). 
168 See id. at 649-50. 
169 [d. at 642. The procedures British courts review under natural justice include the 
right to be heard by an unbiased tribunal, the right to have notice of charges of miscon-
duct, and the right to be heard in answer to charges. [d. at 649. 
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seen as predominantly within the province of statutory con-
trol. 170 
The licensing of RU 486 reveals the independence of statutory 
agencies such as the CSM. Members of Parliament did not know 
of the pending decision on RU 486 until shortly before the Health 
Secretary made the official announcement that it would be dis-
tributed.l7l Such a scenario would be unlikely in the United 
States, given congressional oversight of the FDA.172 In addition, 
British courts exercise a higher degree of deference in regards 
to administrative decision-making than courts in the United 
States. 173 Consequently, unlike U.S. reliance on Equal Protection 
analysis, British jurisprudence has not addressed gender-specific 
health care issues in relation to natural justice. 
2. U.S. Equal Protection and Gender-Specific Issues 
In the United States, the Equal Protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment may be invoked when legislation makes an 
impermissible classification which causes maldistribution of a par-
ticular thing or outright denial of access to a substantive right. 174 
Difficulties arise, however, in evaluating legislation which only 
addresses the experiences or concerns of a single sex. 175 The 
argument is that legislatures are not imposing a classification 
when an issue is specific to one gender, because legislatures do 
not create the gender distinction itself.176 Indeed, there is a ques-
tion as to whether the doctrine of Equal Protection is capable of 
encompassing decisions which affect only women. 177 
Catherine MacKinnon, a leading scholar in feminist legal the-
ory, has observed: 
170 Teff, supra note 39, at 586-87. 
171 On July 1, 1991, Tories in the House of Commons demanded to know what was 
going on with RU 486 because the only information available was provided by the press 
and not the government. Rowan Dore, Abortion Pill Statement Demanded, July 1, 1991, 
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Inti File. 
172 See text accompanying note 60. 
173 See supra note 56. 
174 See Wendy K. Mariner, Access to Health Care and Equal Protection of the Law: The Need 
for a New Heightened Scrutiny, 12 AM. J.L. & MEll. 345, 350 (1986). 
175 See generally Catherine MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, 
in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 41 (1987). 
176 Susan Estrich and Kathleen Sullivan, Abortion Politics: Writing for an Audience of One, 
138 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 124 n.l0, 145 (1989). 
177 MacKinnon, supra note 175, at 37; Susan Atkins, Women's Rights, in MOBILIZING LAW 
THROUGH SOCIAL ACTION 353 (1986). 
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The legal mandate of equal treatment-which is both a sys-
temic norm and a specific legal doctrine- becomes a matter 
of treating likes alike and unlikes unlike; and the sexes are 
defined as such by their mutual unlikeness. . . . A built-in 
tension exists between this concept of equality, which presup-
poses sameness, and this concept of sex, which presupposes 
difference. 178 
105 
The concept of Equal Protection is at odds with gender-specific 
issues because Equal Protection analysis proceeds on the assump-
tion that for some things, women are the same as men, and that 
for other things, women are different than men. 179 While this 
appears quite rational, the flaw in the scheme is that men remain 
the basis for comparison; "unquestioned is how difference is 
socially created or defined, who sets the point of reference for 
sameness." 180 
The inherent tension between notions of equality and societal 
concepts of gender, i.e. the tension within Equal Protection anal-
ysis itself, can be addressed only by adopting a more appropriate 
point of reference. 181 MacKinnon describes three possible ap-
proaches to Equal Protection analysis: (1) the "difference" doc-
trine, which grants women special protections to the extent that 
they are different from men, and values or compensates women 
for the characteristics which distinguish women from men; (2) 
the gender neutrality or "sameness" doctrine, which grants 
women access to what men have to the extent that they are the 
same as men; and (3) the "dominance" theory which views sex 
inequality questions as a result of systematic dominance-male 
supremacy-and perceives social inequality from the standpoint 
of subordination of women to men. 182 
The difference doctrine underlies standard legal analysis of 
gender-specific issues such as pregnancy.183 Pregnancy presents 
a difficult case in terms of sex equality because it is a situation 
where a woman is simply not "equal" to a man, if equal is inter-
178 MacKinnon, supra note 175, at 32-33. 
179 See id. at 33-34. 
180 Catherine MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under the Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 
1287 (1991). 
181 See MacKinnon, supra note 175, at 40. 
182 See id. at 33, 40. MacKinnon explains that the difference approach, implicitly based 
on Aristotle, misses the fundamental question: "Why should you have to be the same as 
a man to get what a man gets simply because he is one? Why does maleness provide an 
original entitlement, not questioned on the basis of its gender?" [d. at 37. 
183 See id. at 33. 
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preted as "the equivalent of." The law formerly treated pregnant 
women differently than men, and differently than other women, 
in order to grant or deny special protections or benefits. 184 
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA)185 amended Title X 
and "made clear that, for all Title VII purposes, discrimination 
based on a woman's pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination 
because of her sex."186 PDA thus brought the treatment of preg-
nancy, at least by employers, within the analytical scope of the 
gender neutrality doctrine. 187 PDA essentially compelled the 
Court's decision in UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,188 a case which 
addressed employer decisions involving sex-specific traits.189 The 
Court invalidated the company's sex-specific fetal protection pol-
icy,190 because the policy "classifies on the basis of gender and 
childbearing capacity, rather than fertility alone."191 The Court 
mandated that, in order to effectuate the goal of protecting the 
offspring of its employees from lead, Johnson Controls place the 
same constraints or offer the same choices to all fertile individ-
uals. 192 
184 The first such case, Geduldig v. Aiello, upheld a state's disability insurance system 
which excluded benefits for disability accompanying normal pregnancy and childbirth. 
417 U.S. 484 (1974). The Court held that the exclusion did not constitute "invidious 
discrimination" because the state's decision was not based on gender as such. [d. at 494, 
496 n.20. The Court expanded the rationale of Geduldig in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 
by rejecting a Title VII challenge to a private employer's disability plan excluding preg-
nancy. 429 U.S. 125, 137-38 (1976). The Court specifically held in that case that discrim-
ination on the basis of pregnancy is not discrimination on the basis of sex. [d. at 145-46. 
185 Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1978). 
186 Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 684 (1983). 
187 See Pregnancy Discrimination Act, supra note 185, § 701(k). By prohibiting discrim-
ination on the basis of pregnancy because it is the same as discrimination on the basis of 
sex, the Act asserts that pregnant women are the same as all nonpregnant persons in the 
terms and conditions of employment. See id. 
188 III S.Ct. 1196 (1991). 
189 Johnson Controls is not an Equal Protection case, but a brief analysis of its reasoning 
will provide an analogy to the denial of RU 486. 
190 Johnson Controls, III S.Ct. at 1202. Eight employees of Johnson Controls, a battery 
manufacturer, became pregnant while maintaining blood lead levels exceeding those 
recommended by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). In re-
sponse, Johnson Controls barred all women from jobs involving actual or potential ex-
posure to lead, unless the women could medically document their infertility. Men, re-
gardless of whether they were planning a family, were not encompassed by the lead-
exposure policy. [d. at 1203. 
191 [d. The majority stated: "The bias in Johnson Controls' policy is obvious. Fertile 
men, but not fertile women, are given a choice as to whether they wish to risk their 
reproductive health for a particular job." [d. at 1202. 
192 [d. at 1217. "Our conclusion is bolstered by PDA ... [under which] such a classifi-
cation must be regarded as explicit sex discrimination. Respondent has chosen to treat 
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The opinion suggests that attributes ordinarily defined as sex-
specific traits, such as pregnancy, may be recharacterized in ways 
that emphasize sameness rather than difference. InJohnson Con-
trols, the starting point of the analysis is sameness-fertility. Clas-
sifying only on the basis of fertility prohibits the distinctions 
between men and women as well as distinctions between pregnant 
women and all nonpregnant persons that were evident in pre-
PDA holdings. The result reached by the Court by relying on 
PDA seems identical to one it might have reached by applying 
heightened scrutiny to the employer's classification. 193 
The holding in Johnson Controls is also analogous to the result 
reached by utilizing MacKinnon's dominance theory to assess the 
company's fetal protection policy.194 The dominance theory ques-
tions not only the validity of Johnson Controls' classifications, but 
the dynamics of the decision-making process itself. 195 The dom-
inance theory is critical of reality, and far from the mainstream 
rules of law. 196 Yet, 
[i]f sex inequalities are approached as matters of imposed 
status, which are in need of change if a legal mandate of 
equality means anything at all, the question whether women 
should be treated unequally means simply whether women 
should be treated as less. When it is exposed as a naked power 
question, there is no separable question of what ought to 
be. 197 
MacKinnon's view of sex inequality encompasses a variety of 
societal aspects which cause or contribute to the imposed status 
of women. In contrast, traditional legal analysis grants presump-
tive validity to legislative and employment classifications by de-
clining to consider the origins or implications of the classification. 
all its female employees as potentially pregnant; that choice evinces discrimination on the 
basis of sex." ld. at 1210. 
193 See Johnson Controls, III S.Ct. at 1215 ("The fetal protection policy at issue here 
reaches too far .... There has been no showing that the policy is reasonably necessary to 
ensure safe and efficient operation of Johnson Controls' battery manufacturing busi-
ness."). 
194 MacKinnon, supra note 175, at 45 ("Seeing sex equality questions as matters of 
reasonable or unreasonable classification is part of the way male dominance is expressed 
in law. . . . In the dominance approach, sex discrimination stops being a question of 
morality and starts being a question of politics."). 
195 MacKinnon's analysis would focus on the "socially situated subjection of women" 
and the (presumptively) male-dominated power structure of the company. See id. at 41. 
196 ld. at 40. 
1971d. at 43. 
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IV. DENIAL OF RU 486 AS GENDER BIAS 
A. R U 486 and Denial of Access 
The denial of RU 486 in the United States, like Johnson Con-
trols' former policy, is an example of a dubious classification. RU 
486 is not treated like other drugs the FDA evaluates, and the 
agency's decisions about RU 486 are made on the basis of differ-
ent criteria than other unapproved drugs. 198 The Subcommittee 
on Regulation, Business Opportunities and Energy concluded 
that the FDA's justification for the Import Ban-the hazardous 
nature of RU 486-seemed prompted by a shift in policy, rather 
than an objective evaluation of available information. 199 The FDA 
did not contact a single researcher or expert actually studying 
the drug prior to its decision,20o nor did the agency evaluate either 
RU 486 or the two prostaglandins currently used with it for safety 
and effectiveness.201 
Similar to the employer's policy inJohnson Controls, the Import 
Ban reaches too far; there is no showing that it is reasonably 
necessary to ensure the safety, quality or effectiveness of the drug 
at issue. An evaluation of RU 486 on the basis of its many proven 
benefits would mandate a different result than the current Im-
port Ban. Denying access to RU 486 does not further the gov-
ernment's primary objective to preserve and promote the public 
health.202 
It is thus doubtful whether the FDA decision to ban the im-
portation of RU 486 would pass muster under the minimal scru-
tiny afforded by the rational relation standard of Equal Protec-
tion. 
198 See Benten v. Kessler, No. CV-92-3161, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10156, at *14-15 
(E.D.N.Y. July 14, 1992); see also supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text. 
199 See Import Ban, supra note 7, at 1-2. No studies or other scientific data were cited by 
officials of the FDA to support its statement that the drug is a health hazard. See id. at 
39-40. When asked to cite studies that the agency had relied on for its conclusion that 
RU 486 is a hazardous drug, the Associate Commissioner of Regulatory Affairs responded 
that the FDA "certainly just felt like the importation of this drug was very serious." Id. at 
43. 
200Id. at 38. 
201Id. at 36. 
202 "The only way to understand an import alert that has no basis in science for a drug 
that represents no overall threat to the public's health" is to view it as the message of "the 
United States government [that it] does not want this substance to enter this country for 
any reason whatsoever." RU 486 and Medical Research, supra note 26, at 6 (testimony of 
Arthur L. Caplan, Ph.D., Director, Center for Biomedical Ethics). 
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B. RU 486 and Equal Protection 
In accordance with the Equal Protection theories described by 
MacKinnon, RU 486 should be made available in the United 
States. The difference doctrine of Equal Protection would entitle 
access to RU 486 as a means of compensating women for the 
adverse characteristics which distinguish women from men.203 
Even if its use as an abortifacient were to be entirely discounted, 
the potential benefits of RU 486 accrue disproportionately to 
women.204 RU 486 has potential for treatment of diseases and 
disorders which only women suffer as a matter of genetics, and 
thus would equilibrate women with men when it comes to these 
gender-specific concerns. 
The gender neutrality doctrine mandates that RU 486 be made 
available to women because they are the same as men in that the 
government has an equal responsibility to promote public health. 
If men are granted access to the safest procedures available for 
the treatment oflife-threatening disorders, Equal Protection must 
mean that women are entitled to equivalent access to medical 
technology. Under either approach, the potential of RU 486 for 
women's health care renders its denial a denial of Equal Protec-
tion in health care to women. 
Moreover, many compelling arguments can be made that the 
possibility of increased reproductive autonomy with RU 486 is a 
sex equality right deserving protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.205 Mariner argues: 
To permit the withdrawal of RU 486 solely because it ter-
minates pregnancy can be seen as a means of denying women 
203 See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text. 
204 This is apparent when one considers the list of diseases and disorders for which RU 
486 is a potential treatment. Breast cancer, Cushing's Syndrome, endometriosis, and 
fibroid tumors, to name just the most well-documented applications of RU 486, dispro-
portionately affect women. It is also intuitive that RU 486 is applicable primarily to 
women's health concerns because it interacts with progesterone, a female hormone. See 
supra notes 16-30 and accompanying text. 
205 Lawrence Tribe asserts that reproductive autonomy plays a fundamental role in the 
"intensely public question of the subordination of women to men through the exploitation 
of pregnancy." TRIBE, supra note 37 at 2; see also Sara Fuchs, Women's Quest for Economic 
Equality, J. ECON. PERSP. 25, 33-37 (1989) (control over the rate of childbirth as key factor 
in recent gains in women's wages relative to men's); Michelle Stanworth, Reproductive 
Technologies and the Deconstruction of Motherhood, in REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: GENDER, 
MOTHERHOOD, AND MEDICINE 10, 15 (Michelle Stanworth ed., 1987) ("fertility control 
coexists with a powerful ideology of motherhood-the belief that motherhood is the 
natural, desired and ultimate goal of all 'normal' women"). 
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control over reproduction, thus denying them access to a 
particular form of care solely because they are women (or at 
least pregnant women).206 
Even if surgical abortion remains legal in the United States, it 
seems inefficient, if not cruel, to deny women a safer alterna-
tive.207 
C. Gender Bias and RU 486 
Both the British and the U.S. legal and medical systems were 
structured and completely controlled by males until at least the 
beginning of the twentieth century.20B Women as a class, although 
never constituting a numerical minority, have been a political 
minority-if not anon-entity. 209 The dominance theory of Equal 
Protection analysis advocated by MacKinnon suggests that RU 
486 should be made available to women to counteract the effects 
of systematic societal dominance of men over women.210 
Gender bias in governmental actions may be characterized as 
either affirmative or negative.211 The affirmative view is to frame 
gender bias as a denial of the freedom to do something all men 
are allowed to do. Conversely, a negative definition of gender 
bias is a denial of freedom from government restrictions on access 
to things all men may receive. The denial ofRU 486 in the United 
States constitutes gender bias under either view. First, men are 
free to choose when and under what conditions they will assume 
the responsibilities of becoming a parent. Women do not have 
this same choice if their reproductive autonomy is denied. If RU 
486 is currently being denied in the United States because it is 
206 Mariner, supra note 45, at 600; see also Nahid Toubia, Perspectives on the 'Abortion Pill' 
RU 486: Liberation or Nightmare? L.A. TIMES, June 21, 1991, at B7 (U.S. policy on RU 
486 needlessly jeopardizes millions of lives). 
207Id. 
208 "No woman had a voice in the design of the legal institutions that rule the social 
order under which women, as well as men live." MacKinnon, supra note 180, at 1281. 
209 Four women were elected to the Senate in the November 1992 elections, bringing 
the total number of women to 6. Prior to the election, there were 29 women in the House 
of Representatives. An unprecedented 108 women ran for seats in the House of Repre-
sentatives in November 1992. Chris Black, Four Women, Including First Black, Elected, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 4, 1992, at 1. Despite such impressive gains, women and minorities 
in the United States remain drastically underrepresented. See John Hendren, Women 
Lawmakers Try to Make Up for Low Numbers with Combative Stance, States News Service, Feb. 
4, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni file. 
210 See supra notes 194-95. 
211 See generally FRIED, supra note 37. 
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an abortifacient, then all women are deprived of its other benefits, 
despite the fact that not all women are or will ever be pregnant.212 
Thus, analogous to Johnson Controls, fertile men are given a choice 
that is not available to fertile women.213 Secondly, men are free 
from government restrictions on access to the safest means avail-
able for necessary medical procedures.214 To the degree that RU 
486 is less risky than a surgical abortion or a more effective 
treatment for breast cancer, women are not free from restrictions 
on equivalent medical treatment. 
Gender bias is so obvious in regard to the treatment of RU 486 
that it is almost difficult to recognize.215 The class of beneficiaries 
deprived rights by the denial of RU 486 is primarily women, 
while the governmental decision-makers denying the rights is 
virtually all male.216 Almost every conceivable benefit of RU 486 
will accrue only to women,217 and the medical procedure cur-
rently at issue, abortion, could only be required by women. To 
deprive one class of beneficiaries access to particular services is 
to discriminate on the basis of the medical procedure needed.218 
The NHS's distribution of RU 486 to any woman who qualifies 
212 As in Johnson Controls, to treat all females as potentially pregnant is explicit sex 
discrimination. See 111 S.Ct. 1196, 1210 (1991). 
213 See id. Although U.S. women currently do not receive any benefits from RU 486, 
researchers at Iowa State University are conducting experiments with RU 486 to ease the 
birthing process for cattle. RU 486 Report, supra note 2, at 2. 
214 It is interesting to note that the FDA gave approval to David Grow to import RU 
486 as an experimental treatment for his inoperable brain tumor. The agency's decision 
came less than a week after the Supreme Court denied Benten the use of RU 486, and 
resulted from Mr. Grow's testimony at the third hearing held by Wyden's subcommittee. 
RU 486: Brain Cancer Patient Obtains Drug, Aug. 10, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis 
Library, AbrtRpt File; see also FDA Says a Cancer Patient Can Use RU 486, BOSTON GLOBE, 
July 30, 1992, at 11; Samantha Kennedy, FDA Ruling on Abortion Pill is Shocking, Unfair, 
HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 3, 1992, at 13. 
m See MacKinnon, supra note 180, at 1296 ("The worse the inequality is, the more like 
a difference it looks."). 
21fi To ignore gender is to ignore the fact that the overwhelming majority of legislatures 
are biologically exempt from the restrictions they are imposing. Estrich and Sullivan, 
supra note 176, at 152. 
217 See supra note 204. The potential to improve the quality of life for women with 
breast cancer is of paramount concern, particularly when there has been no progress in 
reducing the death rate from breast cancer in the past twenty years. No Progress Seen in 
Breast Cancer Prevention, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 12, 1991, at 12 (44,500 women die annually 
and over 175,000 women are diagnosed every year in the United States alone); see also 
Import Ban, supra note 7, at 6 (Dr. Horwitz's testimony that RU 486 could provide a safe 
and effective alternative for the one in nine women who will develop breast cancer if they 
live to be 70). 
218 Mariner, supra note 174, at 355. 
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for it is convincing evidence that in Great Britain equitable access 
to health care is more important than political pressures brought 
to bear by a vocal minority.219 RU 486 will undeniably augment 
a woman's ability to decide when or if she will give birth; its 
denial constitutes restricting access to the safest means available 
for abortion. Most importantly, aside from its use as an aborti-
facient, RU 486 should be available in the United States because 
it constitutes a part of comprehensive health care for women. 
CONCLUSION 
The interaction of government policy and regulatory decisions 
in the United States and in Great Britain are indicative of each 
nation's philosophy regarding health care. Decisions by the FDA 
and the CSM regarding RU 486 in one sense focus on the ques-
tion of the legitimate boundaries of federal regulatory power. 
The FDA's Import Ban on RU 486 is at odds with the U.S. notion 
of liberty as freedom from government intervention. Further, the 
FDA's decision creates a political and bureaucratic barrier to the 
introduction of RU 486 in the United States. The licensing of 
RU 486 in Great Britain, on the other hand, highlights the au-
tonomy of the British drug approval system. 
The structure of the U.S. health care system also affects the 
potential use of RU 486. In particular, the political climate re-
garding abortion, and legislative mandates preventing funding 
for abortion, influence current decisions regarding RU 486 in 
the United States. The ability to completely sever abortion fund-
ing from the provision of other women's health services is evi-
dence that reproductive decisions are not regarded as an essential 
part of women's health care in the United States. The NHS in 
Great Britain takes the opposite approach-a comprehensive view 
of medical care which encompasses treatment with drugs like RU 
486. 
RU 486 is a potential treatment for a wide range of illnesses, 
and denial of access to RU 486 in the United States is contrary 
to the recommendations of virtually every reputable medical or-
ganization. It is difficult to justify the denial of potential medical 
219 Medical decisions are beyond the scope of judicial review in Great Britain. See R. v. 
Ethical Comm. of St. Mary's Hosp., 1 F.L.R. 512, 524 (Q.B. 1988). The British approach 
reduces the mingling of politics and science, at least at one level, and thus arguably 
reduces inappropriate influences in regulatory decision-making. 
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benefits because of the drug's proven effectiveness. Indeed, the 
current Import Ban has the effect of discriminating on the basis 
of one particular medical procedure. The continued denial of 
potential benefits to all women on the grounds that some preg-
nant women may use it for one (legal) purpose is nothing less 
than discrimination on the basis of sex. It is disheartening that 
the numerous benefits RU 486 will provide for women's health 
care have not yet eclipsed the political maneuvering which has 
essentially placed any claims of entitlement beyond the reach of 
the judicial system. 
Denise Chicoine 
